Problem with Frege's philosophy of language

Problem with Frege’s puzzle of identiy:

Frege believes that words have a public meaning. That signs are connected to objects of the world independently of the human cognition or intermediation of the individual’s psychology. That is Frege’s platonic world of language. But this view is incorrect.

The justification offered is that language cannot be a private enterprise because that will preclude communication. However our pronunciation of words is also private, each person has his own slightly different ways of pronouncing, and yet we are able to effectively communicate.

Hence our meanings are private even while allowing for communication (Chomsky). Each word is conceptualized in the mind and according to that conceptualization, if there is a reference to that word, it is determined accordingly.

Furthermore, we also have to grant the following: that everything is conceptualized. There is not such thing as a real world, independent of our conception of it. If there is we have no access to it, because everything we access is through the repertoire of our concepts given by our faculties and those we have put together artificially or given through language.

So, there is a concept Bertrand Russell in our head, which is instantiated when we come across Bertrand Russell. If we come across Russell in some guise that we are unfamiliar with then even though he is Russell, our concept of Bertrand Russell is not instantiated. We don’t see or think of that person as Russell.

So, if a concept is a name, then it is attached to a concept of that person that we have constructed and stored in our memory, and if that concept is invoked then we know who is being talked about. In this light, lets analyse the apparent puzzle between the morning star and the evening star. Morning star  corresponds to a concept in the head, through which it is mediated and through which is it individuated. So, if we in our conceptual knowledge know that the concept of morning star and the evening star actually talk about the same object individuated in our conceptual scheme then we say they are the same.

Sameness deserves an extended comment: In this case a particular sense of sameness is employed according to which two stars are same iff their physical bodies are same. We could have a notion of sameness, that if stars appear at different times of the day then they are not same. So we invoke a particular sense of sameness attached to the concept and our understanding of stars, and therefore, if we have knowledge that the physical bodies (another concept) of the morning star and the evening stars are same, then they are same. So, then we can say that evening star is the morning star (with a particular implied sense of sameness used in the word is). Alternatively, it won’t make sense to say that the ‘half moon’ is the ‘full moon’ in spite of the fact that both are talking about the same physical moon and yet the equation will not make sense, because the equation is not between the physical bodies, but between the conceptualization of the ‘half-moon’ and the conceptualization of the ‘full-moon’, and the criterion of sameness as it applies to these conceptualization is different from one which applies to the morning star and evening star. Furthermore, the criteria of sameness differs based on the interests of the parties involved. For example for a scientist studying the celestial bodies, the sun that rises each day is different from the previous day, because it has a different mass.

Therefore, Frege’s puzzle of identity only arises only because of his metaphysical assumptions about language in which terms have a reference, which is unmediated through our conceptual faculties. Such an object cannot be, because in order for objects to be, they have to be conceptualized first, and thus individuated.  

To further elucidate the points covered above:

a.      Just as Frege claims that numbers are not attached to objects but to concepts, according to which objects are individuated, and thus counted; likewise, what constitutes an object is a concept as well. Only when and once the object is individuated according to some concept is it considered an object. Nothing in of itself is an object, at least as far as human perception goes, unless it is brought under some concept.

b.     Individuation is according to the conceptual scheme—different schemes will lead to different individuations (compare the conceptual scheme at atomic level, with the level at which human beings regularly interact with objects such as chair, table etc.). What counts as one depends on which conceptual scheme is employed.

c.      A consequence of the above is that objects are not available outside of human cognition. Rather, they are posterior to perception. Only by the mediation of perception are things called objects i.e. individuals which are different from other individuals.

d.     Thus, Frege’s referents can’t be talked about in the kind of language we use. Referents presuppose individuation, and individuation presupposes concepts or sense. Hence, there is no simple concept-free way to talk about referents as objects.